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OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO GREEN PROCUREMENT
IN THE COUNTY:
INTEREST GROUPS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROFESSIONALISM

ABSTRACT
Scholars and practitioners have come to understand the important role of
local governments in the causes and effects of climate change. The
literature has examined both the substantive and symbolic determinants of
urban sustainability policies in addition to the implementation issues
associated with those policies. At the heart of these policies is the idea that
local governments have the desire and ability to engage in socially and
environmentally responsible practices to mitigate climate change. While
important, these studies are missing a key component in the investigation
of local government involvement in sustainability policies: government
purchasing power. This study examines the effect of administrative
professionalism and interest group presence on the determinants of green
procurement in the understudied context of counties in the United States.
INTRODUCTION
Scholars and practitioners have come to understand the important
role of local governments in the causes and effects of climate change
(Sharp, et al., 2010). The literature has examined both the substantive and
symbolic determinants of urban sustainability policies in addition to the
implementation issues associated with those policies (Hawkins, et al.,
2015; Terman and Feiock, 2014). At the heart of these policies is the idea
that local governments have the desire and ability to engage in socially and
environmentally responsible practices to mitigate climate change. While
crucially important, these studies are missing a key component in the
investigation of local government involvement in sustainability policies:
public procurement.
Through their purchase of public goods and services, local
governments have the ability to change market practices by mandating the
use of products and services that have a reduced effect on human health
and the environment. However, at odds with the adoption of some of these
policies are concerns from administrative professionals about the cost of
“going green” (Coggburn, 2004) and the pressure brought by interest
groups and manufacturers of “brown” industries that have traditionally
been the providers of public goods and services (Plas and Erdmenger,
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2000). This study examines the effect of administrative professionalism
and interest group presence on the determinants of green procurement in
the understudied context of counties in the United States.
We find that counties with heightened administrative
professionalism in both sustainability and more generally will be more
likely to adopt green procurement practices. This suggests that, contrary
to previous research on green procurement (NACo, 2012), some
governments are beginning to perceive green products as feasible options
for public purchase and consumption. Furthermore, this supports extant
research underscoring the policy choices of governments with professional
management structures (Bae and Feiock, 2013). While we do not find
evidence that the heightened presence of green or brown industries affects
green procurement adoption, we do find that the heightened presence of
environmental advocacy groups has a positive influence on the adoption
of green procurement practices. This is supported by the literature on local
government sustainability policy, which asserts that interest group
demands influence resource allocation and the prioritization of local
government policy (Hawkins, et al., 2015).
In the first section, we define and provide a review of the
contemporary literature on green procurement and place it within the
larger context of local sustainability policy. We close the literature review
with a brief discussion of the understudied context of county governments
and the role that they can play in advancing green procurement practices.
Theory and hypotheses linking interest group presence and administrative
professionalism to green procurement are then tested and the results are
discussed. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our
findings and future research in the study of green public procurement.
LITERATURE REVIEW
What is Green Procurement?
Green procurement, also referred to as environmentally preferable
purchasing (EPP), is defined as “selecting products or services that have a
lesser or reduced effect on human health and the environment when
compared with competing products or services that serve the same
purpose” (EPA, 2000). Green procurement is further understood as using
environmental criteria in supplier selection and product evaluation (New
et al., 2002). EPP includes mandating the procurement of products
certified to meet environmental or energy efficiency standards (e.g. “ecolabeled”); specifying supply chain practices (CEC, 2003) and giving
consideration to the total cost of ownership by using life-cycle assessment
(OECD, 2000) and total life-cycle costing tools (Ergmenger, 2003).

2

Although green alternatives have become increasingly important
to consumers (Drumwright, 1994; New et al, 2002; Webb, Mohr and
Harris, 2008), i governments in both the US and Europe have been slow to
institutionalize them (Michelsen and de Boer, 2009; Bouwer et al., 2006).
A 2012 survey of government purchasers found that 46 of the 236
surveyed included green purchasing practices in their organization’s
formal, strategic procurement plan (NIGP, 2012). Barriers to green
procurement include perceived cost difference, product availability and
performance differences (NIGP, 2001). Underscoring these barriers is the
assumption that the green product market is too underdeveloped for
competition between firms to drive down prices and create superior
products.
These concerns about price are compounded by the fact that green
procurement does not necessarily fit into the traditional values of
procurement – best quality for best price (Arrowsmith and Hartley, 2002).
Generally, lowest price prevails in purchasing decisions and, when green
products were first introduced into the market, their pricing was
considered prohibitive and their quality was either questionable or found
lacking (Case, 2004). Even as new and better quality green products
become available (Plas and Ergmenger, 2000), these original perceptions
of quality and price persist, as well as a widely-perceived lack of specific
knowledge about EPPs (NIGP, 2012; Guenther et al., 2010; Bouwer et al.,
2006). However, advocates of green procurement suggest that the
purchasing power of government (i.e. purchasing consortia, collaborative
product contracts) can transform the market, which will eventually result
in price decreases and a competitive market (CEC, 2003; Habeck, 2003). ii
Determinants of Green Procurement
Few studies investigate the adoption of green procurement in the
public sector (Coggburn, 2004). Some scholars suggest that green
procurement, like other socially responsible innovations in government,
are the result of entrepreneurial purchasing departments procurement
agents (Smith, 2013). Others examine whether adoption is the result of
internal government factors or is adopted as a result of the external
pressures of diffusion (Matisoff, 2008). More generalized research
suggests that countries with the highest rates of green purchasing share
several characteristics: they have strong advocates and national guidelines;
green procurement guidelines and information are readily accessible
through websites; they have integrated measurements of life-cycle costing
and green components in contracting procedures; and they have adopted
their own environmental management systems (Bouwer et al., 2006).
Above all, there is fairly wide consensus that larger, more affluent
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governments have higher rates of green procurement policy adoption
(Michelsen and de Boer, 2009; Smith, 2013).
With the lack of studies on green procurement practices, we take
inspiration for this study from the broader literature on local adoption of
sustainability and environmentally friendly policies. Scholars have
examined the influence that governance incentive structures (i.e. councilmanager vs. mayor-council), interest group influence and capacity have
on the adoption of sustainability policies (Matisoff, 2008). Bae and Feiock
(2013) show that council-manager governments are more likely to adopt
sustainability practices aimed at internal government functions (rather
than those in the community). The assumption is that, in an effort to curry
favor with voters, elected officials (i.e. mayors) will want their
sustainability policies to be more visible in the community. Although the
empirical results across studies have been inconsistent (Krause et al.,
2014; Hawkins, et al., 2015), citizen and interest group support for
sustainability practices are often assumed to influence the development of
sustainability policies. Other literature highlights the role that local
government collaboration and involvement in professional climate
protection networks (i.e. ICLEI membership) has on resource allocation
for sustainability (Feiock, et al., 2014).
Given the existing research base on the adoption of sustainability
policies, the lack of studies on the determinants of green procurement
represents a noticeable gap. Green procurement policies represent a
substantive commitment to institutionalize sustainability in internal
government practices. Since local governments are such considerable
purchasers of goods and services (the Center for a New American Dream
currently estimates state and local government purchasing at over $400
billion annually), their exercise of purchasing power may have much
greater effects on overall environmental and human health than the
broader, potentially more symbolic policy choices. We contribute to the
literature on the local adoption of sustainability policies, in addition to the
broader public procurement literature, by examining the effect of
professional administration and interest group presence on green
procurement policy adoption, as defined by the National Association of
Counties (NACo).
Green Procurement in County Governments
Unlike state governments and municipalities, counties are often
overlooked as a unit of analysis (Benton, 2002). They are often perceived
as constrained by the state, tasked with facilitating elections, tax
collection, and law enforcement (Benton and Rigos, 1985; Deslatte, 2015)
and lacking the autonomy that cities often enjoy (Feiock et al., 2008).
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Despite the perceived limitations of counties, they have considerable
authority in land use and development determinations (Deslatte, 2015;
Feiock et al., 2008), making it important to understand how counties are
organized, how they operate administratively and are influenced by
interest group pressure.
Within the context of procurement, research suggests that counties
are better able to introduce green procurement because they are more
likely to engage in exploratory, or innovative behavior, and that the
movement toward green procurement can be largely traced to
environmental advocates and other interest groups (Clement et al. 2003).
Furthermore, counties have the ability to serve as organizing entities or
network leaders for the local governments that they contain. Thus, green
procurement practices may have the ability to diffuse downward or county
governments may provide cooperative purchasing vehicles that make
green procurement more feasible for municipalities. All of this is to say
that counties remain an important unit of analysis for examining the
adoption of green procurement policy.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Interest Group Presence: Advocates and Suppliers
Local governments, such as counties, are particularly susceptible
to the preferences of local interest groups because they are expected to
respond to local pressures and conditions more readily than national or
state governments. They often also have smaller political markets, which
make political and administrative decision-makers particularly vulnerable
to interest group opposition. Furthermore, unlike municipalities, counties
are often unincorporated with diffuse interests and, therefore, they may be
more likely to be influenced by interest groups (Deslatte, 2015). In the
context of EPP, two such interests include advocates for greener public
policies and potential providers and potential suppliers for public goods
and services.
Advocates: Environment Interest Groups
Environmental interests will put pressure on county governments
to adopt EPP policies. Their challenge will be to overcome the perceived
costs of green procurement. For example, 41% of county respondents to a
survey conducted by the National Association of Counties (NACO) said
that their county does not purchase green products because they “cost more
than traditional products” (NACO, 2012, 4; also see Michelsen and de
Boer, 2009). We suspect that the significant presence of environmental
interests in a given county will be able to overcome the political risk
associated with adopting EPP policies by making it more politically risky
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to not adopt policies. Furthermore, environmental groups will also be able
to communicate the benefits of adopting EPP policies, thereby convincing
county voters that these policies will indeed be in the long-term interest of
the county and/or are not as costly as perceived. Thus, environmental
interests are expected to exert direct pressure on county government
officials in addition to reducing political resistance in the electorate to the
adoption of EPP policies. As a result, we suspect that counties with a
greater number of environmental groups will be more likely to engage in
green procurement practices (H 1 ).
Suppliers: Green and Brown Industries
Potential providers and suppliers of public goods and services
could be perceived as falling into two general categories: (1) green
industries focused on sustainability and renewable technologies that EPP
policies would potentially benefit and (2) brown (fossil fuel-oriented or
chemical production) industries that EPP policies would adversely affect.
The former would support EPP adoption and might, therefore, reduce
wider county opposition. Additionally, the heightened presence of green
industries might make counties more likely to adopt EPP because there
would be more providers in the marketplace. Additional providers would
be likely create a more competitive market environment, therefore making
EPP policies less expensive (CEC, 2003; Habeck, 2003).
For example, many counties have seen an increase in training
programs in green technologies and infrastructure. This is largely due to
organizations such as the Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC),
which has been heavily involved in credentialing programs in energy
efficiency techniques and permitting and siting issues as they relate to
clean energy infrastructure. This credentialing has created more certainty
and standardization in the market for both educational institutions and
individuals looking to be trained in the latest clean energy technologies.
We expect that these facilities not only provide the possibility for more
green industry and competition, but that they also change the industrial
makeup of a county such that there may also be a push for additional
companies involved in green products and technologies to enter the
market. As a result, we suspect that counties with a greater number of
green industries will be more likely to engage in green procurement
practices (H 2 ).
Alternatively, brown industries can create a barrier to EPP
adoption (Matisoff, 2008). Brown, or environmentally inferior, industries
(Marron, 1997), refer to firms whose products and materials have
traditionally been purchased by governments and generally do not
contemplate potential negative environmental impacts. Because
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procurement has been identified as an important tool in the development
of local companies (Preuss, 2007), it is expected that county procurement
activities would normally seek to facilitate the development of their local
economies (Matisoff, 2008) regardless of whether they represent green or
brown technologies. EPP policies represent a reduction in demand for their
local products. Furthermore, the heightened presence of these industries
suggests that there is less of a market for EPP products, which make these
policies more expensive. As a result, we suspect that counties with a
greater number of brown industries will be less likely to engage in green
procurement practices (H 3 ).
Professional Administration: Professional Networks and
Bureaucratic Structure
Professional administration is believed to influence the adoption
of innovative and socially responsible procurement practices, such as
vendor diversity and e-procurement (Arrowsmith, 2010; McCrudden,
2004). While this has not always been the case with green procurement
(Coggburn, 2004), we suggest that the definition of responsible
procurement may be expanding to include environmental concerns.
Additionally, the literature on the effects of professional management
indicates that when governments are run by individuals with heightened
administrative expertise and stewardship, decision-makers will be
insulated from the preferences of the electorate (Deslatte, 2015; Carr
2015), which may be less environmentally or socially responsible.
We frame professional administration in two ways: (1) the
professionalism and capacity of individuals working in county agencies
and (2) the bureaucratic structure of county government. The causal
mechanism for the former is administrator response to the socialization,
professionalization and information diffusion that occurs across
individuals in counties through professional organizations and trade
associations. The causal mechanism for the latter is the incentive structure
for the county chief administrator (elected or appointed) and prioritization
of environmental and sustainability responsibilities, through agency
assignment, which prioritizes some government functions over others.
Professional Networks
Green procurement adoption is expected to spread through
professional organizations through the use of communication networks
that encourage innovation adoption and promote professional capacity
(Perkins and Neumayer, 2008; Busch and Jörgens, 2005; Studlar, 1999;
Savage, 1985). There is considerable evidence to suggest that
administrators rely on professional norms in their decision-making
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(Keiser, 2010) and that these norms are informed and facilitated by
professional networks. Furthermore, these innovations create professional
accountability between administrators that are often independent of the
goals and preferences of the governments for which these administrators
work.
We understand the effect that individual professionalization has
on adoption of EPPs in terms of (1) government administration more
generally and (2) procurement more specifically. With regard to
professionalism more broadly, we suggest that involvement in
professional networks aimed at the management of financial resources and
governmental solvency will facilitate the adoption of green procurement.
The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) is one such
organization. GFOA seeks to enhance and promote the professional
management of governmental financial resources through sharing best
practices, providing educational and training opportunities, and by
facilitating networking among its members. This association annually
recognizes top performing public organizations in the areas of budgeting,
financial reporting, and innovation. The GFOA Award for Excellence
focuses on innovations in financial management, including areas such as
accounting, technology, investment management, and debt administration
(gfoa.org). Recipients of this award not only have the benefit of
organizational membership but they also have recognition for
innovativeness in the field. Individuals working for counties that are
GFOA Award recipients will be more likely to be part of influential
networks and will have exposure to the most innovative practices. We
expect that they will also influence their governments to be leaders in
green procurement. As a result, we suspect that counties that have been
recipients of the GFOA Award for Excellence will be more likely to engage
in green procurement practices (H 4 ).
With regard to procurement professionalization more specifically,
we suggest that involvement in organizations such as the National Institute
of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP) will advance best practices in green
procurement. NIGP hosts expos and forums for public procurement
practitioners so that the most current information can be shared across all
levels of government and national borders. They co-sponsor the biennial
International Public Procurement Conference, where procurement
professionals from all over the world gather to share practitioner- and
research-based innovations. For all of these reasons, membership in NIGP
is regarded in this study as engaging in professional
development/enhancing professionalization within an organization,
which, we suspect, will make counties more likely to engage in green
procurement practices (H 5 ).

8

Bureaucratic Structure
Bureaucratic structure is defined in two different ways: county
governance structure and sustainability agency assignment. While
counties generally serve as an intermediary between the state and its
citizens, they have undergone reforms in terms of governance structure in
order to better carry out their responsibilities (Benton and Rigos, 1985).
Many counties have now adopted a commission-administrator structure
that provides for professional (as opposed to elected) executive leadership
in conjunction with a multi-member commission (Feiock et al., 2008).
This professional leadership frees counties to engage in more socially
responsible policy choices such as green procurement. Additionally,
professional managers will be less likely to curry favor with political
interests in order to stay in power (Bae and Feiock, 2013) and more likely
to have an interest in wider government operations and community
benefits (Zhang and Feiock, 2010). Thus, we suspect that counties with
commission-administrator structures will be more likely to engage in
green procurement practices (H 6 ).
While local governments have become increasingly involved in
sustainability policy, there are considerable differences across counties in
terms of the location and assignment of actual sustainability offices. “The
position of a program within the bureaucratic structure of government –
whether as an independent unit or a subpart of another…can meaningfully
affect its priorities” (Krause, et al., 2014). Having a stand-alone
sustainability office suggests not only that a government takes
sustainability and environmentalism seriously but that it also has the
implementation infrastructure to support these policies. Furthermore, a
county that invests in a stand-alone sustainability office can be perceived
as making a real, tangible investment in creating or maintaining
sustainability in their community. Counties with a sustainability office, at
least on the surface, would indicate that the organization has
institutionalized ideological change demanded by their constituents, such
as a green procurement policy. This may or may not reflect fiduciary
efficiencies within the organization, but rather extends to include more farreaching environmental and/or sustainability objectives and indicates
heightened professionalization. Thus, we suspect that counties with standalone sustainability offices will be more likely to engage in green
procurement practices (H 7 ).
Sample

RESEARCH DESIGN
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As noted above, the unit of analysis in this study is counties. To estimate
this analysis, a stratified random sample – based on population size – was
taken. An initial sample of 300 counties was taken: 100 counties under a
population under 50,000, 100 counties with populations between 50,000
and 500,000, and 100 counties with populations greater than 500,000.
After additional research and background interviews with county officials,
the decision was made to drop counties with populations less than 50,000
because the majority of these counties do not have purchasing
departments. Of the 200 counties remaining in the study, data were
collected for 174 because of the availability of relevant data.iii
Data and Measurement
Green Procurement Practices
The measurement of the dependent variable, green procurement
practices, was inspired by the National Association of Counties’ (NACo)
Green Purchasing Toolkit, which has identified purchasing practices
indicative of innovative green procurement. These practices include (1)
whether counties have a formal environment purchasing policy (EPPs) in
place, (2) whether their request for proposals (RFPs) include eco-label
language (i.e. Energy Star requirements), (3) whether their RFPs include
green criteria specifications (i.e. “energy efficient,” “low toxicity,”
“compostable,”) and (4) whether they communicate green purchasing
goals and/or requirements to vendors. The use of the NACo Green
Purchasing Toolkit is useful as a benchmark for green purchasing because
this is one of the few organizations that has developed best practices and
guidance specifically aimed at county purchasing departments.
Furthermore, NACo’s guidance is accessible to non-members; therefore,
it is expected that counties seeking legitimacy in relation to their green
procurement practices will follow their guidance. The dependent variable,
overall, was measured as an additive index of the four aforementioned
NACo practices (formal EPP policy, eco-label language included in RFPs,
green criteria specifications in RFPs, and whether or not green
goals/requirements are communicated to vendors) (=0.687). These
measures are memorialized in Table 1.

Table 1: Codebook and Measurement
Measurement
Data Source
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EPP Practices
Interest Group
Presence
Environmentalist
concerns
Renewable
technologies
Chemical industry
Oil and gas
industry
Professionalism
NIGP membership
GFOA excellence

Additive index of EPP
practices

County purchasing
departments

Environmental nonprofits with
receipts > $50,000

NCCS matched with
NTEE database (990
forms)
IREC Clean Energy
Directory
2012 Economic
Census

IREC-credentialed providers
w/onsite training in the county
Number of chemical
production employees in the
state
Number of petroleum
production employees in the
state
County NIGP membership
Recipient of GFOA Award of
Excellence
Presence of county
sustainability office

Sustainability
office
Appointed
executive
County Affluence and Economies of Scale
Population density
County population per square
mile
Median income
Median income

2012 Economic
Census
NIGP membership
records
GFOA membership
records
County department
directories

2010 Census Bureau
2010 Census Bureau

Data on green procurement practices index was based on a
thorough search of county websites, which was conducted from February
to April 2013. Each website was examined for evidence of engaging in
environmentally preferable purchasing. In order to ensure reliability and
prevent data collection, two additional reviewers were engaged to evaluate
the county websites. There were no material differences in the findings
across the three data collection reviewers. iv
Evaluating online source material is suitable because the sharing
of county purchasing manuals online has become a common practice.
Additionally, because consumer pressure has been found to be a driver for
an increase in the use of environmental criteria in supplier selection (New
et al., 2002), many counties are eager to demonstrate to their communities,
and potential state and federal grantors, that they are developing green
purchasing practices. v One way to do this is to make that information
available through their websites.
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Each item in the green procurement index was operationalized in
the following manner. Environmentally Preferable Purchasing Policy
(EPP) was determined by whether counties had mandated use of EPP
products in at least one of its purchasing areas. vi This is determined by
examining the standard operating procedures (SOPs) set forth by each
county purchasing department. These SOPs provide guidance for all
County entities engaged in purchasing. To determine whether or not a
county had RFPs that included eco-labels, RFP solicitations and bidding
documents were examined. In most cases, these documents are required to
be public and are either posted online or available for review by contacting
the county purchasing office. Of observed RFPs, labels such as LED,
EnergyStar, LEED Silver Standard, Green Seal standards, and
Envirochemical Synergy requirements were observed. If any of these EcoLabel RFPs were observed, the scorecard was marked yes. To determine
whether counties had RFPs with green specifications, all open RFPs were
analyzed to determine whether any of the specifications were green –
based on the NACo Toolkit referenced above. Green specifications such
as zero VOC paint, recycled content, hybrid and electric automobiles, and
biodegradable, among others, were all observed in county RFPs.
Lastly, for the variable of whether green goals were
communicated to vendors, websites were reviewed for any notice that was
provided to vendors regarding a preference for green products and/or
services. Most county purchasing websites have a “Doing Business”
section, which includes information for vendors about how to access RFPs
and what kind of products and/or services the county procures. Other
counties prepare vendor packets and brochures that included their green
purchasing policy and/or recycled materials preference while others
include detailed standard terms and conditions for doing business with the
county, within which green goals are embedded. If a county made clear
their preference for green products, either through their purchasing
homepage, in their standard terms and conditions, in information prepared
specifically for vendors or individuals seeking to contract with the county,
or some other way not noted above, the scorecard was marked yes. Table
2 shows the breakdown of green procurement practices based on
population groupings.

Table 2: EPP Practices and Population Groupings
500,000 +
50,000 –
(n=95)
499,999
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Total

(n=79)

Green Purchasing Plan
Eco-Labels in RFPs
Green Specifications in RFPs
Green Product Preference
Communicated to Vendors
0 Practices
1 Practices
2 Practices
3 Practices
4 Practices
Total

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

61
78
76

18
1
3

54
81
75

41
14
20

115
159
151

59
15
23

75

4

77

18

152

22

Total

Total

Total

60
13
5
1
0
79
(45%)

48
20
17
5
5
95
(55%)

108
33
22
6
5
174
(100%)

Interest Group Presence
Environmental interest group presence was measured by
examining the number of nonprofit organizations filing IRS Form 990 at
the county level. This data was collected from the National Center for
Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The NCCS counted 16,789 registered
Environmental public charities filing Form 990, required for tax exempt
organizations with gross receipts greater than or equal to $50,000
(www.irs.gov/), in the spring of 2013; the sample of counties was
compared to the organizations falling within NTEE (National Taxonomy
of Exempt Entities) category EN (Environment and Animals) to determine
how many of them fell within the selected counties.
Renewable technologies industry and good availability was
measured by using the clean energy training directory developed by the
Interstate for Renewable Energy Council (IREC). The Clean Energy
Directory consists of IREC-credentialed providers that offer certificates
and training in renewable energy and energy efficiency. The specific
operationalization that we used was the number of IREC-credentialed
providers in a given county with onsite training. These credentialed
providers influence the market supply for building and green products in
a given region. This data was collected during April 2013.
The presence of oil and gas production and chemical
manufacturing industry groups was measured by using the 2012 economic
census data of state manufacturing sectors. The oil and gas industry was
operationalized using the number of petroleum production employees.
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Chemical manufacturing industry presence was operationalized using
the number of chemical production employees.
vii

Administrative Professionalism
County professionalism was operationalized in four different
ways: whether or not the county has been a recipient of a Government
Finance Officers Association (GFOA) Award of Excellence, whether a
county was a member of the National Institute of Governmental
Purchasing (NIGP), county form of government (appointed not elected
executive) and whether the county has a stand-alone sustainability office.
The data for GFOA Award Excellence and NIGP membership was
collected using membership and organization documents, which were, in
some cases, followed-up by phone calls to counties and the professional
organizations for verification. Data on county form of government was
collected by examining the county charters in the sample. And, lastly data
on whether or not the county has a stand-alone sustainability office as
opposed to a single program embedded in a larger office or program was
collected through county organizational charts and followed-up by phone
calls for clarification.
Control Variables
We control for county affluence and economies of scale, which
we expect will be positively associated with green purchasing practices
because of the perceived expense of environmentally friendly practices.
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that that states with slack
resources are more likely to adopt government innovations (Walker,
1969). We believe that this applies to green purchasing practices. These
control variables were operationalized as population per square mile and
median income.
Analytic Technique and Model
The dependent variable is a count with substantive values ranging
from zero to four. We do not treat this dependent variable as ordinal
because zero has a true meaning, as do each of the other values of the
dependent variable. As Table 1 suggests, there is overdispersion in the
count dependent variable. Thus, negative binomial regression was used to
examine the influence of our variables of interest on the count of green
procurement practices. However, as the descriptive statistics of the
dependent variable suggest, more than half of the sample adopted zero
green procurement practices at the time of data collection. Therefore, we
decided to also conduct logistic regression for whether or not counties had
adopted at least one of the NACo specified procurement practices. This
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enabled us to determine if there were particular county characteristics that
influenced the adoption of at least one EPP practice but did not affect
whether they adopted more than one.
RESULTS
Table 2 indicates the breakdown of the dependent variable. Of the
174 counties examined, a third had some kind of written policy for
purchasing environmentally preferable products, fewer than 10% used
eco-labels in their RFPs, 13% used green specifications in their RFPs, and
almost 13% communicated to vendors a preference for environmentally
preferable products. The majority of counties (104 out of 174) actually
adopted no green practices. However, 19% had one item, almost 13% had
two items, and 3% had three items and four items, respectively. Clearly,
many counties have still not implemented environmentally preferable
purchasing practices. However, some counties have excelled at it: at least
one county in the study banned all Styrofoam purchases while another
banned the use of all virgin wood.
As the descriptive statistics in Table 3 indicate, counties had an
average of 58 environmental nonprofits. Of our sample, 60% of counties
had NIGP membership; 11% had received the GFOA Award of Excellence
and only 8% had stand-alone sustainability offices. Commissionadministrator county governments made up 54% of our sample.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Mean
SD
Min
EPP Practices
0.661
1.02
0
Interest Group Presence
Environmental
57.799
63.411
1
nonprofits
Renewable technologies 0.322
0.974
0
Chemical establishments 25.489
36.891
0
Oil/gas establishments
31.851
103.808 0
Professionalism
NIGP membership
0.603
0.491
0
GFOA excellence
0.109
0.313
0
Sustainability office
0.08
0.273
0
Council-manager
0.54
0.499
0
County Affluence and Economies of Scale
Population density
3654
17158
47
Median income
57316.6 14340.0 32479
7
1
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4

Max

400
10
305
1060
1
1
1
1
155779
120096

Table 4 contains the results for both estimations. Both models
yielded a statistically significant result for the likelihood ratio test of the
overall models. Furthermore, the likelihood-ratio test for alpha in the
negative binomial estimation was statistically significant (p < 0.014),
indicating that there is evidence of overdispersion (and that negative
binomial regression is the correct technique over poisson). The logit model
accurately correctly classified the dependent variable at 77.7%. The results
in Table 4 are listed in log odds. To facilitate coefficient interpretation, our
discussion here is in terms of odds ratios.

Interest Group
Presence
Environmentalist
concerns
Renewable
technologies
Chemical industry

Table 4: Green Procurement Practices
Negative Binomial
Logit Estimation
Estimation
o(Std. Error)
S(Std. Error)

Oil and gas industry
Professionalism
NIGP membership

0.006
(0.002)***
0.091
(0.085)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)

0.352
(0.267)
GFOA excellence
0.170
(0.331)
Sustainability office
0.690
(0.357)*
Appointed executive
0.455
(0.24)*
County Affluence and Economies of Scale
Population density
0.125
(0.065)*
Median income
0.00
(0.00)***
-3.161
Constant
(0.607)***
* p < 0.1
LRχ2 = 40.3***
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
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0.010
(0.004)**
-0.0204
(0.201)
-0.005
(0.007)
0.002
(0.002)
0.551
(0.412)
0.984
(0.594)*
1.65
(0.712)**
0.697
(0.386)*
0.095
(0.112)
0.00
(0.00)***
-4.737
(1.041)***
LRχ2 = 48.24***

Of the variables representing interest group presence, the number
of environmental nonprofits was statistically significant in both models,
with a stronger effect for the logit estimation. As the results for the
negative binomial model show, for every additional environmental
nonprofit in the county, the expected number of green procurement
practices increases by 0.5%. The results in the logit model are only slightly
higher: for every additional environment nonprofit in the county, the
expected number of green procurement practices increase by 0.9%.
The results of the administrative professionalism variables
showed a stronger effect in the models. Receiving the GFOA Award of
Excellence was not statistically associated with the count of green
procurement practices. However, receiving the GFOA Award of
Excellence increased the likelihood that counties would adopt at least one
green procurement practice by a factor of 2.68. As the results for the
negative binomial model show, having a stand-alone sustainability office
increases the expected number of green procurement practices roughly
99%. Similarly, having a stand-alone sustainability office increases the
probability that a county adopts at least one green procurement practice by
a factor of five.
The effect of median income was positively associated and
statistically significant in both models; but this effect was extremely small
to the point of being negligible. Population density had a statistically
significant effect on the count of green practices but not whether or not
counties adopted at least one green procurement practice.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Much like the results in the broader sustainability literature,
interest group presence is somewhat mixed. While environmental
advocacy groups have a positive impact on the adoption of green
procurement, the increased presence of green and brown industries has no
statistically significant effect. This may be explained by the differences
between advocacy groups and potential public goods and services
providers (i.e. brown and green industries). Environmental advocacy
groups often concentrate their efforts on particular governmental or
industry practices. Thus, their energies are more concentrated than those
of green and brown industries because the core function of the latter two
is to produce goods and services (not necessarily lobby for changes to
public policy).
The results of the measures of professionalism are particularly
interesting. Previous survey research (NIGP, 2001) and academic studies
(Michelsen and de Boer, 2009) have suggested that heightened
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professionalization, in general, may make governments less likely to adopt
green procurement policies. We hypothesized the opposite and found that
governments that have won the GFOA award of excellence and have
commission-administrator systems are more likely to adopt green
procurement practices. This may suggest that, in relation to traditional
products and services, the perceived (or actual) marginal costs of green
products and services are decreasing. Alternatively, county professionals
may put a different value on the purchase of green products. Perhaps the
traditional procurement mantra of best quality for best price (Arrowsmith
and Hartley, 2002) is beginning to expand to something that includes
environmental and product lifecycle concerns as noneconomic buying
criteria (Drumwright, 1994).
The effect of having a stand-alone sustainability office is less
surprising. The literature on the organization of attention (May, Workman
and Jones, 2008; Terman, 2014) and administrative organization (Krause,
et al, 2014) underscores the importance of bureaucratic structure. Not
unlike individual decision-makers, governments have limited decisionmaking ability and, therefore, must prioritize particular functions over
others. By having a stand-alone sustainability office, governments have
already prioritized environmental concerns in addition to developing an
implementation infrastructure to facilitate green procurement.
Economies of scale and affluence are also supported by the extant
literature. Finding that larger and more established organizations were
more likely to engage in green procurement, Michelsen and de Boer
(2009) suggest that larger organizations have a greater capacity to build
the knowledge required for engaging in green procurement and may be
more likely to have a strategic approach to purchasing (also see Chia and
Al-Hawamdeh, 2002 & Brown, 2004). Alternatively, dense counties with
more affluent populations may be better able to afford green procurement
policies because of their economies of scale and economic resources.
There are a number of theoretical and empirical limitations in this
study that can be addressed through future research. The analysis is crosssectional for all practical purposes. Thus, we cannot assert strict causation
between environmental advocacy firms and county professionalism and
green procurement. A study such as this requires panel data over time to
assert causation. Our measures also require some refinement. The
categories of green and brown industries could be better focused on
specific green product areas rather than more broadly.
Additionally, we do not know why and/or how green procurement
was first adopted in these counties. For example, does green procurement
diffuse across regions or neighboring counties? Or, are these practices
stimulated by collaborative arrangements that enable governments to
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purchase together in economies of scale? Without knowing more about
why these procurement practices have been adopted, it is difficult to
identify how a county can begin to institutionalize green purchasing.
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One example of this consumer pressure is adoption of Environmental Management Systems (EMS), such as ISO 14000 series standards or the
European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), both of which include green purchasing components (Coggburn, 2004).
ii
For example, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) suggests that green procurement has the potential to stimulate innovative
product and business development in addition to new product/service markets (CEC, 2003).
iii
Upon review of the county websites, it was determined that, for the 50,000 – 499,999 population range, three counties did not have active
county websites, fifteen counties did not have purchasing departments or perform purchasing functions, and an additional three counties did not
have any purchasing materials available online. For the 500,000+ population range, five counties did not have any purchasing materials available
online. These twenty-six counties were excluded from the study and the remaining county websites were reviewed for the information included in
the table below.
iv
We did not, however, use a formal test of interreliability.
v
Studies of corporate social responsibility (CSR), for example, demonstrate that companies use their websites to communicate their CSR
activities to their shareholders (Snider et al., 2003; Maignan and Ralston, 2002; Ersock and Leichty, 2000). Because green purchasing by counties
can be conceived of similarly and is a CSR activity in private companies, it is believed the county websites are used in much the same way, that
those counties that are more engaged in green purchasing will promote it on their websites.
vi
This field was initially conceptualized as having six possible responses, based on the categorizations in the NACo Toolkit: (1) broad, meaning
there is a policy establishing some green purchasing priorities; (2) specific, meaning the policy mandates particular products such as recycled
content requirements; (3) mandated, meaning the policy requires all county purchases to meet specific green guidelines; (4) discretionary,
meaning the policy allows flexibility and permits staff to use their judgment; (5) formally-accepted administrative procedure, meaning a clear
process is established but it is not a formal policy; or (6) none, meaning there is no evidence of a green purchasing policy. Upon collecting the
data, it was discovered that most counties have products for which there was a formal and mandated EPP. However, for other products EPP's
were suggestive (i.e. use green products one not cost prohibitive). And, in other cases, the purchase of particular materials were banned (i.e.
styrofoam or harsh chemical products).
vii
The economic census provides data for all petrol employees in the sector, which include white collar and production employees, in addition to
production petrol employees only. The number of production employees only was used in order to prevent over-inflation of the sector measure,
which would be caused by the inclusion of corporate petrol salaries.
i
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